Realist or anti-realist, ethical theory, as long as it postulates existence of moral truths, needs to propose an account of human practice of recognizing them. Some realists don't hesitate to ascribe the crucial role in that process to intuition of individuals, capable, they claim, of making genuine discoveries in the independent realm of objective morality. Others, however, and certainly most anti-realists, see coming to recognize moral truths as, above all, a social process, and thus work towards a constructivist theory of morality.

In my paper, I propose a rough comparison between two political models such a theory may follow and two sets of metaethical presuppositions which condition opting for one or the other. I suggest that the choice between „liberal” and „communitarian” form of constructivism in ethics is far from innocent. If fact, I hope to show that only the second of them stands a chance of accounting both for the content of our moral beliefs and the dynamics of their acquisition – if that turns out to be true, it would, I believe, constitute a serious argument against metaethical views whose partisans can only accept the „liberal” model of metaethical constructivism.