Wlodek Rabinowicz

Incommensurability and Vagueness - from Values to Probabilities

Abstract

Setting off from the Fitting-Attitudes analysis of value, according to which x is valuable if and only if it is fitting to have a proattitude towards x, I will present my account of value relations that makes room for both incommensurability and vagueness in value comparisons. I will go on to suggest that an analogous approach could be used to model both incommensurable probabilities and vague probability comparisons, provided one adopts an analysis of probability that is structurally similar to the FA-analysis of value. On this format of analysis, to be probable is to be credible. More precisely, x is probable to degree k if an only if it is fitting, given evidence, to assign to x credence of degree k. Thus, this analysis connects probability to an attitude (credence), but unlike the subjective probability accounts, it makes probability an explicitly normative notion.