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## Disagreement and bootstrapping

ABSTRACT: Adam Elga has argued that one ought to endorse the equal weight view in the epistemology of disagreement because it is the only view that does not permit you to "bootstrap" your way to the conclusion that you are epistemically superior to all those who disagree with you. Thomas Kelly has responded to this argument by seeking to motivate the claim that some instances of this type of reasoning are rational, and thereby attempting to show that the equal weight view must be false because it would always rule it out. This paper will show that Kelly's response is unsatisfactory because he has not identified an instance of rational bootstrapping. Following this, I offer the correct diagnosis of the bootstrapping argument and show why it fails as an argument in support of the equal weight view. I achieve this by arguing that the inductive inferences involved in these bootstrapping arguments are not justified.