

Krzysztof Poslajko

Department of Philosophy

Jagiellonian University, Krakow

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From epiphenomenalism to eliminativism?

The causal exclusion argument (formulated, among others, by Jaegwon Kim) purports to show that if we accept nonreductive physicalism in the philosophy of mind then we end up with the conclusion of type epiphenomenalism, claiming that mental properties have no causal powers. This conclusion is widely deemed unacceptable. One of the reasons for this (which is given by Kim himself) is that type epiphenomenalism leads to eliminativism, which is a form of irrealism about mental states (i.e. the belief that sentences belonging to folk psychology cannot be true). I will argue that this transition is based on the conviction that causal efficiency is a criterion of existence for properties. Using David Lewis's notion of sparse and abundant properties, I'd like to demonstrate that even if we admit that the sentence "mental properties don't exist" can be true, given a certain interpretation, we still aren't committed to any strong form of irrealism concerning mental properties. Thus, there is no straight inference from type-epiphenomenalism to eliminativism.