Kinga Jęczmińska<br>\section*{Intuitions Behind the Hard Problem of Consciousness}

Chalmers (1995) claims that the hard problem of consciousness cannot be solved by contemporary neuroscience since it does not explain why performance of certain functions give rise to experience. Chalmers rejects Crick and Koch's suggestion of $35-75 \mathrm{~Hz}$ neural oscillations in the cerebral cortex, Baars's global workspace theory, Dennett's multiple drafts model, Edelman's neural Darwinism model and Jackendoff's intermediate level theory, claiming that they leave the bridging question unanswered (Chalmers 1995). Similarly, the neural basis of visual consciousness in the activation of the ventral stream (Goodale \& Milner 1992) could not solve the problem.

However, it seems that the hard problem might be extended to other disciplines of science, leading to questions why particular mechanisms or structures give rise to certain things and not others (Block 2006). This argumentation makes the hard problem either illusory or impossible to answer at all. Thus the hard problem might be restricted to a question how something objective can be subjective or how something first-personal can be thirdpersonal, as proposed by Block (2006). Yet, such reformulation may not save the problem from triviality or, even if it does, a similar problem may still apply to disciplines not concerned with consciousness.

Furthermore, thought-experiments that aim at showing that it is impossible to fully explain consciousness in a scientific way (e.g. the knowledge argument) presuppose that structures and functions of mental states are not enough to explain the phenomenal consciousness, which is true only when the hard problem holds, so these thought-experiments cannot be used in the argumentation in favour of the hard problem (Carruthers \& Schier 2012). The hard problem of consciousness seems to presuppose the explanatory gap instead of proving it. Thus the hard problem seems either illusive or not well argued for.

