

*Jackson's Knowledge Argument*

Presenting two thought-experiments about Fred and Mary, Jackson's knowledge argument aims at proving that physical knowledge does not constitute the totality of knowledge concerning perception and especially colour qualia. I will argue that the argument presupposes what it is expected to prove.

The argument imposes a specific understanding of phenomenal character of qualia whose intrinsic properties are claimed to be non-relational. However, this traditional notion of qualia makes them in fact ineffable, as argued by Dennett.

It might be claimed that physicalism together with contemporary neuroscience is already capable of giving certain idea of what it is like to perceive new colours. Following Thompson's argumentation, it might be indicated that Fred would really see not one new colour, but additionally several other new colours made by mixing the new colour with colours already existing in our colour space: Fred would be tetrachromatic instead of trichromatic.

The thought-experiment concerning Mary merely shows logical possibility rather than natural possibility of the scenario. Moreover, as indicated by Churchland, the argument rests on the equivocation of the notion of knowledge. As observed by Dennett, the conclusion about Mary learning something new outside her room cannot follow from the argument's premise that Mary had got complete physical information concerning perception during her confinement.

Finally, following Churchland, I will argue that the argument puts a too strong demand on reduction. The lack of direct deducibility of phenomenological properties from premises restricted to the language of neuroscience does not prove that these phenomenological properties are not reducible to their physical basis.