

# *Qualia and sense-data – a comparison of the thought of C.I. Lewis and G.E. Moore*

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## Abstract

Contemporary philosophers of consciousness are often very fond of accepting the notion of qualia being simultaneously eager to reject the notion of sense-data. In other words, the idea that experience is an awareness of non-physical objects (sense-data) is commonly treated as some old error of the past epistemological theories, and it is hardly given any consideration. Despite this attitude towards the notion of sense-data, the issue of qualia and their role in the theory of experience is still of great importance.

The purpose of my presentation is to exhibit the similarities between the early conception of qualia developed by C.I. Lewis and the sense-data theory as it was originally introduced by G.E. Moore. This comparison aims to show how the sense-data theory was misunderstood and accused of falling into fallacies, such as indirectness of perception or commitment to the so-called phenomenal individuals. Moreover, the remarks on Lewis' conception will be the basis for following statements about qualia and experience:

- 1) Qualia understood as the properties of the given extend the categories of subjectivity and objectivity.
- 2) They are of universal rather than particular nature (similarity with the thought of C.S. Peirce)
- 3) They are not directly cognized since they are revealed only through abstraction and they are not experienced.
- 4) They are ineffable.