

## The Autonomy of Non-propositional Knowledge

There is a space between simple skills and highly organized conceptual knowledge (justified true belief). This gap, grasped i.a. in the ancient notions of *techne* and *phronesis*, contrary to the concepts of *episteme* and *doxa*, was often overlooked in the dualistic account of cognizance.

The aim of the paper is to discuss the existence of some types of non-propositional knowledge (dispositions, forms of agency, attitudes) in the aspect of the possibility of its reduction to knowledge organized in semantic and discursive structure, or to one's skills.

To conceive the possibility of ontological reduction, two examples of non-conceptual knowing will be taken into consideration: Gilbert Ryle's know-how and Michael Polanyi's tacit knowledge. Background knowledge and knowledge-in-agency are not based on the explicit rules of formal system (like semantics or syntax), but realized through implicit, embodied rules (more congruent to pragmatics). The role of such dispositions is similar to the non-conceptual content of experience postulated by Tim Crane – they cannot enter into inferential relations (unlike in the Jason Stanley's semantic approach).

It is also difficult to reduce this kind of knowledge to abilities, understood as simple reactions, based on stimulus-response scheme. As being more complex, it determines the success of context-dependent, complicated human agency, both individual (like exercising a laboratory test) and group-oriented (consider joint, but not strictly simultaneous agency of research team). These cases cannot be explained only by taking into account propositional information taught by listening, reading and conceptualizing experience, but also by considering know-how or background knowing, acquired by training, repetition of moves and integrating non-conceptual information.

We are to determine the status of non-propositional knowledge and distinguish knowing from not knowing. The hard problem is, if we should speak in the terms of tension between knowledge and abilities, or find pragmatic way of explanation, like ostensive identification.

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